A proxy DNS leak and WebRTC IP leak are different proxy privacy leak paths; testing DNS through proxy and real-time browser routes helps identify a browser IP leak.<\/p>\n
A proxy DNS leak occurs when name lookups use a resolver outside the route you expected. A WebRTC leak occurs when real-time communication discovers or uses network addresses outside a basic web proxy path. Either can reveal local, direct public, or network-related information even when ordinary browser pages show the proxy IP.<\/p>\n
Leak is relative to your intended configuration. Local DNS may be normal for an HTTP proxy. The problem is assuming all traffic is covered when only web requests are.<\/p>\n
Opening a page can involve DNS, TCP, TLS, HTTP, media, real-time communication, extension requests, and background services. A browser proxy setting commonly handles HTTP and HTTPS. It may not control every UDP path, operating-system resolver, or application on the device.<\/p>\n
Start with the basic proxy request path<\/a>. Once scope is clear, leak tests become engineering checks instead of mysterious warning pages.<\/p>\n Before connecting to a hostname, software needs an address. An HTTP proxy can receive a hostname in a request or CONNECT instruction, but client and implementation behavior vary. SOCKS5 supports domain-name requests, while some clients resolve locally before sending an IP to the proxy.<\/p>\n A local resolver can expose requested domain names to the configured DNS provider and may return region-specific answers based on the local network. It can also create mismatches: the web request exits in one country while DNS selects a destination edge for another.<\/p>\n Remote name resolution is often indicated by a SOCKS hostname mode rather than a plain SOCKS option. Review HTTP and SOCKS5 DNS behavior<\/a> and the application’s documentation.<\/p>\n WebRTC establishes real-time audio, video, and data connections. ICE candidates describe possible network paths. Depending on browser settings, permissions, network topology, and proxy support, candidate information may include local or public addresses.<\/p>\n MDN documents the WebRTC ICE candidate address property<\/a> and notes the privacy implications of exposing addresses. Modern browsers have added protections, but behavior still varies. A basic HTTP proxy is not a universal WebRTC tunnel.<\/p>\nHow DNS takes a different route<\/h2>\n
What WebRTC can reveal<\/h2>\n
What an observer actually learns<\/h2>\n